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Abstract
Venture projects are fraught with exogenous market risk and endogenous
agency risk. We apply a real options perspective to analyze the investment de-
cision of the venture capitalist (VC) in this set-up. The solutions presented
are conflictive: the VC reduces his exposure to exogenous risk by delaying in-
vestments to wait for informational updates (delay option), but he mitigates
endogenous risk by advancing investments to discover entrepreneur’s e ort. So
far, papers focus on the optimal timing of investments considering independence
of exogenous and endogenous risk. We show that interdependence of exogenous
risk and endogenous risk exists. We find that endogenous risk prompts the VC
to accelerate the discovery process when exogenous risk is high, and to abandon
the delay option when it is most valuable.
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1 Introduction
Venture firms operate in highly dynamic markets, where future market conditions are
particularly uncertain and can change very fast. In this environment, the venture cap-
italist (VC) has to cope with two tasks: he has to manage his investment risk with
respect to market uncertainty, and he has to manage the project with respect to agency
conflicts. The market uncertainty describes exogenous risk that impacts the prospects
of the venture project, such as technological progress within the industry, trending con-
sumer behavior or competitor’s response to new products and services. It is out of the
control of the VC or the entrepreneur, making the venture project basically a bet on
future market conditions. The agency conflicts between the VC and the entrepreneur
describe endogenous risk that impacts the successful realization of the project, such as
uncertainty about the e ort of the entrepreneur.
In this set-up, we analyze the investment decision of the VC in a real options frame-
work. Real options describe future decision rights, rights but not obligations to take
some action in the future. This provides a decision maker flexibility to act upon infor-
mational updates (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; McDonald & Siegel, 1982; Trigeorgis, 1996).
The real options theory suggest that investments are exposed to two types of risk:
exogenous risk that is irreducible through organizational activity, and endogenous risk
that can be substantially influenced by organizational activity (Folta, 1998; McGrath
et al., 2004).
By applying staged capital infusion, the VC creates future investment opportunities.
Once he committed an initial investment to a venture project, he receives the right
to participate in future financing rounds of the project. Furthermore, the VC decides
whether to immediately commit funds to advance the development of the project, or
to defer investments to slow down the sped of development.
On the one hand, the VC can reduce his exposer to exogenous risk by deferring invest-
ments to wait for informational updates about the future market conditions: if market
conditions turn out to be favorable, he commits additional funds to capitalize on the
growth prospects of the project. Conversely, if market conditions turn out to be bad,
he abandons the project to confine high downside losses (Li, 2008). On the other hand,
the VC mitigates endogenous risk by learning about the behavior of the entrepreneur
(Chi & McGuire, 1996): by investing the VC observes the performance of the project
and aggregates beliefs about the e ort of the entrepreneur.
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The solutions presented to exogenous and endogenous risk are conflictive: with re-
spect to exogenous risk, the VC defers investments to confine downside losses. With
respect to endogenous risk, the VC advances investments to discover the e ort of the
entrepreneur. So far, papers focus on the optimal timing of investments considering
independence of exogenous and endogenous risk (Li, 2008; Gompers, 1995; Neher, 1999;
Bergemann & Hege, 1998). Interdependence of exogenous and endogenous risk is not
yet considered. We assume that this interdependence exists. The reason is as follows:
entrepreneurs will have motivation to expend their e ort if future market conditions
are seemingly favorable and prospects of the venture firm are high, but their motivation
might decrease if expectations about future market conditions change and depress the
firm’s prospects. The interdependence of exogenous and endogenous risk refers to the
idea of a relative value of private benefits. In periods of high market uncertainty, the
entrepreneur’s expected payo  from the project is downgraded. Private benefits from
managing the firm become more attractive to the entrepreneur relative to the successful
realization of the project. As a consequence, his incentive to behave opportunistically
increases.
We introduce a formal model to show how agency conflicts tighten in a world of un-
certainty and analyze the resulting decision making of the VC. To manage agency
conflicts in times of high market risk, the VC has to accelerate investments to advance
the learning process. As a consequence, he su ers opportunity loss because he aban-
dons the delay option when it is most valuable. We find empirical support for our
theory. We analyze a sample of individual European VC funding from 2003 - 2015.
The joint e ect of time-serial market risk and cross-sectional agency risk accelerates
investments to venture projects.
The remainder proceeds as follows: section 2 gives an overview of the related literature,
in section 3 we introduce a formal model to analyze the decision making of the VC,
in section 4 we test the implications from the formal model empirically and conduct
robustness checks, section 5 concludes.
3
2 Related Literature
In a set-up with exogenous and endogenous risk, the VC’s funding decision can be
analyzed in a real options framework (Hsu, 2010; Li, 2008). Real options are future
decision rights, rights but not obligations to take some action in the future. Future de-
cision rights o er a decision maker flexibility to act upon informational updates (Dixit
& Pindyck, 1994; McDonald & Siegel, 1982; Trigeorgis, 1996). In the real world, deci-
sions are not static. E.g., a decision maker can defer the initiation of a project to wait
for additional information about future market condition, once started the project he
can abandon it at any given stage of development if environmental conditions turn bad,
and he has the option to expand the project if environmental conditions turn out to
be more positive than expected (Trigeorgis, 1996). In venture finance, VCs use stage
financing to create future investment opportunities. Once he committed an initial in-
vestment to a venture project, he usually receives the right to participate in future
financing rounds (Li, 2008). Furthermore, this gives the VC the opportunity whether
to concentrate funds in early stages of the project or defer investments shifting them
to later stages. This decision is based on the information available and the information
gathering process.
Exogenous risk in venture projects is related to unexpected market developments, e.g.
technological progress within the industry, trending consumer behavior or competitor’s
response to new products and services that depress the project’s expected value (Li,
2008). Exogenous risk is is out of the control of a decision maker and resolves primarily
with the passage of time (McGrath, 1997; Pindyck, 1993; Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). In
this case, the timing of investments can be seen as decision whether to hold the current
option to invest and wait for informational updates about the market conditions or
to invest immediately and capitalize on the information available (delay option) (Li,
2008). If market conditions turn out to be favorable, the VC commits additional funds
to earn a high return. Conversely, if market conditions turn out to be bad, he aban-
dons the project to confine high downside losses (Li, 2008). If uncertainty about future
market conditions is high, the option to wait for informational updates is economically
more valuable than immediate investment (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; McDonald & Siegel,
1982; Trigeorgis, 1996). Recent research shows that VCs delay the initiating and con-
tinuation of venture projects when market uncertainty is particular severe (Li, 2008;
Li & Mahoney, 2011).
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Endogenous risk in venture projects is related to agency conflicts between the VC
and the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur inhibits the role of a contracting agent and
owns human capital, such as specific skills or knowledge, essential to realize the ven-
ture project (Hart & Moore, 1994). Furthermore, venture project’s are characterized
through a high fraction of intangible assets and growth opportunities giving great dis-
cretion to the action of the entrepreneur (Amit et al., 1998; Bergemann & Hege, 1998;
Cornelli & Yosha, 2003; Burchardt et al., 2014; Gompers, 1995; Neher, 1999). He might
be unwilling to expend e ort to maximize shareholder’s value (Gompers, 1995; Chan
et al., 1990; Hansen, 1992), or be willing to extract informational rents from informa-
tion asymmetries (Aghion & Bolton, 1992; Hellmann, 1998; Kirilenko, 2001).
When risk can be substantially influenced by organizational activity, the VC can re-
duce his exposer by learning (Chi & McGuire, 1996): by investing the VC observes the
performance of the project and aggregate beliefs about the e ort of the entrepreneur.
To avoid an ine cient continuation of the venture project, the VC implements various
mechanisms like contingent control allocation (Chan et al., 1990; Kirilenko, 2001), con-
vertible securities (Casamatta, 2003; Cornelli & Yosha, 2003; Repullo & Suarez, 2004;
Schmidt, 2003), and staging (Bergemann & Hege, 1998; Neher, 1999).
We argue that investing is always possible. Hence, in a world of uncertainty, the option
to delay investments is economically more valuable than investing. Any characteristics




3.1 The Venture Project
We describe a venture project as a one-shot (static) problem. A financially constrained
entrepreneur E owns a project with uncertain returns. The project is financed by a
venture capitalist V C. E provides e ort Á, with Á = {0, 1}. The e ort of the en-
trepreneur is a critical resource for the success of the firm. Physical assets purchased
have no value to the V C without the e ort of the entrepreneur (Hart & Moore, 1994).
The V C and the E are considered to be risk-neutral. The VC provides the total in-
vestment in equity financing only. The V C and E agree on a sharing contract in t = 0.
The sharing contract defines the entrepreneur’s share SE of the project’s payo  and the
timing of the investments. The project requires a total investment I to be completed.
The VC follows an investment path i0, ..., iT to provide funds. The investment path
gives the VC the opportunity to time his investments. The funding is completed at
time T with 0 Æ T Æ 1 and IT = I = qT0 it. Investments are sunk once committed to
the project. Time is standardized to the interval [0, 1]. The discount rate is d = 0.
In t = 1, an exogenous stochastic shock ﬁ is realized with probability (1 ≠ p), with
p œ [0, 1]. Probability (1 ≠ p) is related to the level of exogenous risk and is ex-ante
known by the E and the V C. The project is valueless if the shock is realized, oth-
erwise the project generates the payo  V (Á). The project’s value follows a Bernoulli
distribution
V (Á) =
Y_]_[ 0 w. Pr. (1≠ p)V (Á) w. Pr. p (1)
with V (1) > 0 and V (0) = 0. In other words, the E has to expend e ort to realize the
project.
Probability (1 ≠ p) is out of the control of the E and the V C, and resolves with the
passage of time. There is a confidence level ◊ﬁ(T ) at time T that ﬁ is realized in t = 1.
It describes the aggregation of beliefs about the future market conditions over time.
◊ﬁ(T ) is based on the square-root-of-time rule. The rule allows higher frequency risk
estimates to be scaled down to a lower frequency. It is commonly used when financial
risk is time aggregated. The confidence level ◊ﬁ(T ) is
◊ﬁ(T ) = T 0.5 (2)
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3.2 Maximization Function of the Venture Capitalist
Exogenous risk (1 ≠ p) constrains the project’s expected payo . I0 is a non-arbitrary
staging path of the V C that immediately invests I in t = 0. The V C’s expected payo 
P (0)V C is
P (0)V C = ≠I0 + (1≠ SE)pV (Á) (3)
Over time, the V C becomes more confident about the exogenous stochastic shock ﬁ
being realized in t = 1. I1 is a non-arbitrary investment path, where the investment
process is completed in t = 1. To show the impact of delaying investments, we simplify
the staging path I1 to the situation where the VC invest I in t = 1. Hence, the total
investment is delayed until uncertainty about the realization of the shock is revealed.
The VC only invests if ﬁ is not realized. The expected payo  P (1)V C is
P (1)V C = (≠I1 + (1≠ SE)V (Á))p (4)
The staging path provides the V C the option to delay investments until he is more
confident about the realization of the exogenous stochastic shock. The economic value
of this delay option D(T ) is positively related to the probability (1 ≠ p), and delay
T > 0.
D(T ) = P (T )V C ≠ P (0)V C (5)
= ◊ﬁ(T )[≠I(p≠ 1)] (6)
The V C maximizes his total payo  P (T )V C
P (T )V C = argmax
T
{(1≠ SE)pV (Á)≠ I + ◊ﬁ(T )[≠I(p≠ 1)]} (7)
3.3 Participation Constraint of the Entrepreneur
E chooses between the two e ort levels Á = 1, and Á = 0. If E expend e ort (Á = 1),
he can realize V (1) with probability p. Since E does not provide funds, the de-
lay of investments has no economic value to him. His expected payo  P (t, Á)E is
P (1, Á)E = P (0, Á)E = P (Á)E, where P (1, Á)E specifies the case when the V C invests I
in t = 1 and P (0, Á)E specifies the case when the V C invests I in t = 0.
Since tasks of the entrepreneur are highly interdependent and can not be monitored
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accurately, his e ort level Á can not be observed directly. The V C discovers the ef-
fort of the entrepreneur by aggregating beliefs conditional on the performance of the
project. The discovery process is characterized by some imprecision –, with – œ [0, 1].
Imprecision – is equal to zero if the e ort of the entrepreneur and the performance of
the firm are perfectly correlated. Conversely, if the e ort of the entrepreneur and the
performance of the firm are not perfectly correlated, it is – > 0. This describes the
level of project’s endogenous risk. Endogenous risk di ers across projects and is related
to the discretion project’s assets provide to the action of the E, e.g. when tasks of the
entrepreneur are highly interdependent, observing the performance of the project will
provide only little information about his true e ort (Zenger, 1994).
In that, – defines a certain fraction of the investment I that E can divert for private use
if he choose Á = 0. Choosing Á = 0, E degrades the project in T and earns imprecision
cost C. It describes his dis-utility of e ort.
Given imprecision, the V C has to discover the e ort Á in an endogenous process to e -
ciently reduce agency risk: he updates his expectation about E’s e ort Á conditional on
the performance of the project. A bad performance indicates Á = 0. The performance
of the project is observed when it is continued; and funds are required to purchase
assets to continue the project. In that, the discovery process is controlled by the V C
conditional on the rate of investments. A high investment rate (small T ) allows the
VC to observe the performance of the project early and to discover entrepreneur’s true
e ort Á sooner. By investing, the VC implements a set of binding provisions to reduce
agency conflicts and confine imprecision cost. Hence, imprecision cost C is conditional
on the rate of investments.
C = –IT (8)
Hellmann (1998) predicts that the more wealth constrained the entrepreneur is, the
more likely is investor control. Furthermore, Kaplan & Stromberg (2003) show that
VC’s control rights are allocated such that the VCs obtain full control if the venture
project performs poorly. If the V C discovers true e ort Á = 0 in T , the V C gains full
control over the project to punish E. In this case, E can not divert funds for private
use. But, since the V C can not realize the project without E, payo  P (T )V C is zero
as well. E maximizes
P (Á)E = argmax
Á
{sEpV (Á)≠ C} (9)
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The entrepreneur will choose Á = 0 if




The ratio describes the relative value of private benefits. This is the amount of funds
diverted for private use (E chooses Á = 0), relative to the payo  from the project
(E chooses Á = 1). E’s incentive to behave opportunistically (to chooses Á = 0), is
positively related to probability (1 ≠ p) that the exogenous shock ﬁ occurs, and the
level of imprecision –. The entrepreneur is indi erent between Á = 1 and Á = 0 when
his expected payo  from the project equals imprecision cost C. The participation
constraint P.C.E that incentivizes E to chose Á = 1 is
sEpV (1) Ø C (12)
sEpV (1)≠ –It Ø 0 (13)
3.4 Solution without Imprecision
In the first best case, there is no imprecision. By definition this is – = 0 and there is
no imprecision cost.
C = –IT = 0 (14)
Inserting C = 0 into the participation constraint of the entrepreneur P.C.E, the mini-
mum payo  P (1)E to incentivize E to chooseÁ = 1 is
P (1)Eúú = 0 (15)
The E earns no surplus over his cost of capital. The V C maximizes P (T )V C . T úú and
SúúE is
T úú = 1 (16)
SúúE = 0 (17)
The payo  to the V C is
P (T úú)V C = [≠I + V (1)]p (18)
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The VC earns all the payo  from the project and the total value of the delay option.
3.5 Solution with Imprecision
In the second best case, imprecision exists. By definition this is – > 0. The e ort of
the E is not perfectly correlated with the observed performance of the project. For
T > 0 imprecision cost C arise. The V C has to vest share SE of project’s payo  to E
to incentivize him to choose Á = 1. With respect to the participation constraint of the
entrepreneur P.C.E, SE is




For I = 1 and V (1) = 1, we maximize the payo  P (T )V C of the V C. T ú and SúE are






Endogenous risk – and exogenous risk (1 ≠ p) increase the share SE vested to the
entrepreneur and reduce the residuum share of the VC. The payo s to the V C and the
E are
P (T ú)V C = (1≠ SúE)pV (1)≠ I + ◊ﬁ(T ú)[≠I(p≠ 1)] (23)
P (1)E = –IT ú (24)
The V C and E share the surplus from the project. The E earns the imprecision cost
over his cost of capital. The V C receives the residuum payo  and the value of the
delay option.
3.6 Opportunity Loss from Imprecision
In a world of uncertainty (1≠ p) > 0, the option to delay investments is economically
more valuable than immediate investing. This is shown in (6): the value of delay
option D(T ) is positively related to the probability (1≠ p) that the exogenous shock is
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realized. Since delay T ú is negatively related to the level of imprecision –, agency risk
forces the VC to advance investments. If (1 ≠ p) is high, this must arise opportunity
loss. Opportunity loss is present if D(T ) < D(1). In the first best solution, the V C
invests I in t = 1 and realizes D(1). There is no opportunity loss. In the second
best solution, the VC maximizes his payo  P (T )V C with respect to the participation
constraint of the entrepreneur P.C.E. For T > 0 imprecision cost C arise. For C > 0,
the V C has to vest share SE > 0 to E, to incentivize him to choose Á = 1. The VC
will benefit from deferring investments as long as the marginal profits from the delay
















For I = 1 and V (1) = 1,
≠–≠ (p≠ 1)2T 0.5 < – (27)




The result shows the critical level of imprecision –ú at which the V C realizes the total
value of the delay option D(1). Formula (28) demonstrates that the critical level of
imprecision –ú is multiplicative with respect to the probability (1≠ p).
In table 1 and figure 1, we give a numerical example to illustrate the impact of exoge-
nous and endogenous risk on VC’s optimal timing of investments T ú. For (1≠p) > 0 and
T ú < 1 opportunity loss arise. We present the resulting opportunity loss D(1)≠D(T ú)
in table 1 and figure 2. For any level of endogenous risk –, opportunity loss decreases
in exogenous risk (1≠ p). This means that the VC defers investments to capitalize on
informational updates if exogenous risk is high. Conversely, for any level of exogenous
risk (1 ≠ p), opportunity loss increases in the level of endogenous risk –. This means
that the VC accelerates investments and abandons a fraction of the delay option to
initiate the discovery of entrepreneur’s e ort if endogenous risk is high. In that, en-
dogenous risk restricts the value of the delay option.
The VC accelerates the discovery of entrepreneur’s e ort in exogenous risk (1 ≠ p).
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This is because the relative value of entrepreneur’s private benefit CsEpV (Á) increases in
exogenous risk, increasing his incentive to behave opportunistically. As a consequence,
the V C has to abandon a larger proportion of the delay option when it is most valuable.
This accelerates his opportunity loss. We derive three testable hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: VCs delay investments if exogenous market risk is high.
Hypothesis 2: VCs advance investments if endogenous agency risk is high.
Hypothesis 3: VCs accelerate investments if exogenous market risk and en-
dogenous agency risk are high.
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Table 1: Numerical Illustration
T* D(1)-D(T*)
– –
0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6
0.75 0.879 0.694 0.563 0.465 0.391 0.047 0.125 0.188 0.239 0.281
0.7 0.766 0.605 0.490 0.405 0.340 0.088 0.156 0.210 0.255 0.292
(1≠ p) 0.65 0.660 0.522 0.423 0.349 0.293 0.122 0.181 0.228 0.266 0.298
0.6 0.563 0.444 0.360 0.298 0.250 0.150 0.200 0.240 0.273 0.300
0.55 0.473 0.373 0.303 0.250 0.210 0.172 0.214 0.248 0.275 0.298
We illustrate the optimal timing of the investment as a function of the delay of investments Tú in Fig. 1, and the resulting opportunity





































Our sample covers individual financing rounds from venture projects based in 15 Euro-
pean countries1 for the period from 2003/01/01 to 2015/12/31 from Dow Jones Venture
Source. The sample period covers the post-dotcom bubble period and the financial cri-
sis of 2007. Furthermore, the sample period covers the European sovereign debt-crisis
in 2009 that came along with an expansive monetary policy of the European Central
Bank.
We exclude venture firms from the energy and utilities sector. Energy-related infras-
tructure projects, and renewable energy production was strongly supported and highly
regulated by the European Union within the sample period.
We use sector classifications provided by Dow Jones Venture Source. Sector classifica-
tions are matched to the GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) classification
scheme based on industry descriptions. We aggregate industries’ end-of-the-year busi-
ness ratios of listed firms from Compustat global.
4.2 Econometric Method
We analyze the the duration of a financing round. This is defined as the time be-
tween the completion of two subsequent financing rounds. An increasing duration
characterizes a delay of investments. Conversely, a decreasing duration characterizes
an advancement of investments (Gompers, 1995; Li, 2008).
We use a di erence-in-di erence approach to analyze the joint e ect of exogenous and
endogenous risk on the duration of the financing round. The method allows us to
separately estimate a time-series e ect of exogenous risk, a cross-sectional e ect of
endogenous risk, and a joint e ect of exogenous and endogenous risk.
We use an accelerated-failure time model to fit information about the duration into a
parametric regression model. We model duration by the survival time of the financing
round. Failure is the completion of the round. The censoring date is the date of the
initial public o ering, acquisition or bankruptcy. Ongoing investments are censored
after five years (1825 days). To follow each event for five years, we restrict our analysis
1Belgium, Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland, Sweden
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to financing events that took place between 2003/01/01 and 2010/12/31. This leaves
us with 7,336 observations.
The survival function S(t) is the probability that a financing round is completed later
than t
S(t) = P (T > t)
The failure time is modeled by a linear e ect composed of the covariates and a random
disturbance term ‘. ‘ is a vector of errors assumed to come from a known distribution
and ‡ is an unknown scale parameter. We fit the model to the natural logarithm of
the duration and Weilbull distribution of the error term. The model fits the paper’s
focus on the timing of investments since the estimation parameters in the accelerated
failure time model can be interpreted as the influence of the explanatory variables on
the failure time. This model is commonly used in duration studies (Gompers, 1995; Li,
2008). The parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood method with a Newton-
Raphson algorithm. The standard errors of the parameter estimates are estimated
from the inverse of the observed information matrix. The model is
Log(Duration) = –+ “t(Exogenoust) + —i(Endogenousi)
+ ”t,i(Exogenoust*Endogenousi)
+ ’i(Controlsi) + ‡‘t,i
where Duration is the duration of the financing round; Exogenoust is a time-series
variable that captures exogenous market risk, “t estimates the time-series e ect of
exogenous market risk on the duration of the financing round. Endogenousi is a
vector of cross-sectional variables that captures firm’s exposure to endogenous agency
risk. —i estimates the cross-sectional e ect of endogenous agency risk on the duration
of the financing round. ”t,i is the joint e ect of exogenous and endogenous risk on the
duration of the financing round. Controlsi is a vector of individual control variables,
’i is the vector of its estimation parameters.
4.3 Measures
4.3.1 Exogenous Risk
Exogenous market risk is related to unexpected market developments that are out of
the control of the entrepreneur and the VC (Li, 2008; McGrath, 1997; Pindyck, 1993;
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Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). We relate exogenous risk to market price volatility. It captures
the level of accumulated market uncertainty (Cochrane, 2005). VCs delay investments
to ongoing projects and the initiation of new projects if the aggregate market volatility
is high (Li, 2008, Li & Mahoney 2011). We use the level of the Euro Stoxx 50 Volatility
Index (VStoxx 50) at the funding date to measure exogenous risk. The index is based
on Euro Stoxx 50 options prices and reflects the one year ahead market expectation of
volatility.
4.3.2 Endogenous Risk
We relate endogenous agency risk to tasks of a start-up entrepreneur in developing an
innovative product, and scaling the venture firm. First, tasks in developing an innova-
tive product are highly interdependent (Bishop, 1987), e.g technological process might
accelerate or constrain the speed of developing an innovative product. The early per-
formance of the project is conditional on technological process in that the entrepreneur
reaches milestones faster if the technological environment is favorable. From the per-
spective of the VC, it is di cult to discover whether a good performance is solely up-on
the e ort of the entrepreneur or results from a favorable technological environment.
This is especially the case for tasks where the entrepreneur has to expend primarily
cognitive e ort, because entrepreneur’s true cognitive e ort can not be discovered by
observing his actions (Zenger, 1994). When the correlation of entrepreneur’s true e ort
and the performance of the firm is highly imprecise, the VC has to advance the develop-
ment of the firm to aggregate beliefs about entrepreneur’s true e ort. As a consequence,
agency risk is high if the project requires substantial cognitive e ort to develop a new
innovative product. We relate the e ort required to develop an innovative product to
the R&D intensity of the industry. The development will require substantially more
e ort of the entrepreneur if the industry is R&D intense. VCs advance investments to
ongoing projects if they operate in R&D intense industries (Gompers, 1995; Li, 2008).
We measure R&D intensity by industry’s median R&D-expenditures-to-sales ratio at
previous year’s end (Gompers, 1995; Li, 2008).
Second, scaling the venture firm is related to the realization of growth opportunities.
But, from the perspective of the VC, it is di cult to discover whether a favorable
performance, e.g. increasing sales volumes, results from high e ort of the entrepreneur
or are due to a favorable growth environment. This is especially the case, because
growth opportunities provide the entrepreneur the chance to manipulate the growth
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signal revealed to the VC (Cornelli & Yosha, 2003). E.g. the entrepreneur might en-
gage in short term sales activities to reveal a more positive signal to the VC without
increasing his true (long-term) sales e ort. When the performance revealed to the
VC is manipulated in such a way, the correlation of entrepreneur’s true e ort and the
observed performance of the firm is highly imprecise. The VC has to advance the
development of the firm to aggregate beliefs about entrepreneur’s true e ort. Agency
risk is high if the the venture project implies strong growth opportunities. Firm’s
growth opportunities are substantially larger if the industry is characterized by strong
growth opportunities. VCs advance investments to ongoing projects if they operate
in an industry characterized by high growth opportunities (Gompers, 1995; Li, 2008).
Strong growth opportunities are signaled by a high market-to-book ratio (Chan &
Chen, 1991). We measure growth opportunities by industry’s median market-to-book
ratio at previous year’s end (Gompers, 1995; Li, 2008).
4.3.3 Contract Design
The financing instrument defines whether the VC is more actively involved in the oper-
ations of the project or inherits a passive role. By equity investments the VC receives
power in the board of directors. This provides him the opportunity to monitor endoge-
nous performance and approve significant decisions. It possesses strong governance
abilities when compared to debt instruments in that it emphasizes behavior control
of the entrepreneur (Fama & Jensen, 1983). This reduce exposure to endogenous risk
and might encourage the VC to take rather advantage of the delay option than to
advance the discovery process. We classify debt-like and an equity-like instruments.
We assume pure debt and convertible debt to posses the characteristics of a debt in-
strument, whereas equity swaps and pure equity posses the characteristics of an equity
instrument.
Small funding amounts limit opportunistic behavior of the entrepreneur in that they re-
duce the bargaining power of the entrepreneur (Neher, 1999). A small funding amount
will prevent the investor’s claim from a bid down. This reduce exposure to endogenous
risk and might encourage the VC to take advantage of the delay option.
VCs syndicate to obtain a second opinion about the quality of the entrepreneurial
project in the pre-investment phase and to provide improved value-adding in the in-
vestment phase (Lerner, 1994; Brander et al., 2002). Moreover, those tasks are not
independent from each other as an e cient selection of the project increase the ef-
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fectiveness of the VC’s involvement (Casamatta & Haritchabalet, 2007). VCs that
syndicate their investment will perform more e ciently allowing them to implement
monitoring and control mechanisms at lower cost. This allows the syndicate to im-
plement closer monitoring and control activities. We classify deals with two or more
investors involved as syndicated investments.
4.3.4 Firm-specific Information
Firm-specific information such as financial statements and interviews with employees
reveal the entrepreneur’s management ability, its motivation and e ort. The avail-
ability of such type of information is linked to project’s age (Amit et al., 1998). It
acts as a track-record of entrepreneur’s past activities. When uncertainty about the
entrepreneur’s type is reduced, imprecise contracting diminishes. The VC can take
advantage of the delay option instead of initiating a discovery process. We calculate
project’s age counting the days between the start date of the project and the date of
the financing event.
Moreover, venture projects di er in quality. The VC gathers this information in the
screening process (Casamatta & Haritchabalet, 2007; Sahlman, 1990). But, the screen-
ing process is exposed to adverse selection concerns. Higher quality projects have a
more urgent need for capital to finance their future growth (Li, 2008). As a conse-
quence, entrepreneurs initiating low quality projects have incentive to imitate higher
quality projects to increase their funding. Hence, staging is more important for projects
that pretend to be of high quality; since staged financing rejects low promising firms
(Sahlman, 1990). By controlling for the quality of the project, we separate adverse
selection risk and moral hazard risk, that is the concerns about a misrepresentation of
project’s quality and the concerns about the true e ort of the entrepreneur. Moreover,
e ort of the entrepreneur is necessary but not su cient for the success of the firm: even
high quality projects will not succeed without entrepreneur’s e ort; however, even if
the entrepreneur expend high e ort to a low quality project, it will not succeed. We
measure quality by an ex-post indicator of success, which is an exit of the firm (Gom-
pers, 1995; Li, 2008; Brander et al., 2002; Gompers & Lerner, 2000; Sorenson & Stuart,
2001). We use information about an exit of the firm based on the information available
on Venture Source at the date of data generation. We classify projects that had an
IPO or tradesale as high quality projects.
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4.3.5 Environmental Conditions
VCs adjust their investments according to market signals such as the general boom and
bust cycles of the public equity markets, and economic growth. We control for total
VC funding in the previous year which is positively related to good funding conditions
(Gompers et al., 2008; Cherif & Gazdar, 2011; Fe´lix et al., 2013).
Favorable institutional environments such as a strong corporate governance and in-
vestor protection increase the power to mitigate agency conflicts (Cumming et al.,
2010; Jeng & Wells, 2000). We control for the home country of the venture firm to
address the impact of di erent institutional environments.
At least, we control for venture firm’s industry sector to account for unobserved sector-
specific fixed e ects.
4.4 Empirical Results
In our sample, the average duration of a financing round is 593 days, approximately
19.5 months. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and correlations of the variables.
None of the correlations are sources of concern for multi-collinearity.
To apply the di erence-in-di erence approach, we identify firms fraught with endoge-
nous risk based on industries’ R&D-to-sales ratio and market-to-book ratio; and fi-
nancing rounds exposed to exogenous risk based on the aggregate level of market price
volatility at the funding date. We use log rank test statistic to estimate break-point
values of the variables. For any R&D-expenditures-to-sales ratio, market-to-book ra-
tio, or level of the VStoxx 50 Index above the break-point value, we assign the project,
resp. the financing round to be exposed to endogenous, resp. exogenous risk. We ap-
ply the method of Contal & O’Quigley (1999) to estimate the break-piont values. The
method is an outcome-oriented approach to compute break-point values corresponding
on its most significant relation with the outcome, and is designed for survival analysis
with censored data. We compare our break-point values to median values in Table 3.
The break-point value of the R&D-expenditures-to-sales ratio is higher than its median
value. The higher break-point value indicates that only high levels of R&D intensity
increase endogenous risk. The break-point value for market-to-book ratio equals its
median value. The break-point value for the VStoxx 50 Index is lower than its median
value. The lower break-point value indicates that even low levels of exogenous risk
provide the VC an opportunity to take advantage of the delay option.
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We show the results from the duration analysis in Table 4. Estimation (1) is the base-
line model that includes the control variables. We find that VCs adjust the timing
of investments according to the contract design, the availability of firm-specific infor-
mation, and environmental conditions. Estimations (2) to (6) add information about
exogenous and endogenous risk. The new information does not change the impact of
the control variables.
The first hypothesis states that VCs delay subsequent investments to wait for informa-
tional updates about the market conditions when exogenous risk is high. We include
the dummy variable Market Uncertainty in estimations (2), (4), (5) to analyze the
impact of exogenous risk on the duration of the financing round. Market Uncertainty
is equal to one if the VStoxx 50 Index is above the break-point value, and zero other-
wise. We find that VCs defer investments with respect to exogenous risk. In estimation
(2), we model the duration based on the control variables and Market Uncertainty.
Market Uncertainty increases the duration by approximately two months. This cor-
responds to 9% of the average duration of a financing round. In estimation (4),
we add information about project’s endogenous risk. The impact of the variable
Market Uncertainty remains unchanged. In estimation (5), we consider interdepen-
dence of exogenous and endogenous risk. The impact of the variableMarket Uncertainty
increases compared to estimations (2) and (4); in estimation (5) Market Uncertainty
increases the duration by approximately three months. This corresponds to 14% of the
average duration of a financing round. We explain this observation by a high value of
the delay option. Considering interdependence of exogenous and endogenous risk, we
find that the impact ofMarket Uncertainty increases. This indicates that endogenous
risk restricts the delay of investments.
The second hypothesis states that VCs advance subsequent investments to advance
the discovery process when endogenous risk is high. We include the dummy variables
R&D Intensity and Growth Opportunities in estimations (3), (4), (5) to analyze the
impact of endogenous risk on the duration of financing events. R&D Intensity, resp.
Growth Opportunities is equal to one if industries’ R&D-to-sales ratio, resp. market-
to-book ratio is above the break-point value, and zero otherwise. We find that VCs ad-
vance investments with respect to endogenous risk. In estimation (3), we model the du-
ration based on the control variables and R&D Intensity and Growth Opportunities.
R&D Intensity decreases the duration by approximately two and a half months. This
corresponds to 13% of the average duration of a financing round. Growth Opportunities
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does not impact the duration. In estimation (4), we add information about exogenous
risk at the funding date. The impact of the variables remains unchanged. When in-
terdependence of exogenous and endogenous risk is considered in estimation (5), the
impact of the variable R&D intensity slightly increases compared to estimations (3)
and (4); in estimation (5) R&D Intensity decreases the duration by approximately
three months. This corresponds to 14% of the average duration of a financing round.
Growth Opportunities increase the duration for low exogenous risk, but decrease du-
ration for high exogenous risk. We explain the results by the initiation of a discovery
process.
The third hypothesis states that VCs accelerate subsequent investments when exoge-
nous and endogenous risk are high. In estimation (5), we consider interdependence of
exogenous and endogenous risk by an interaction term of Market Uncertainty, and
R&D Intensity, resp. Growth Opportunities. The interaction terms are equal to one
if Market Uncertainty, and R&D intensity, resp. Growth Opportunities are equal
to one, and zero otherwise. We find that interaction of exogenous and endogenous risk
accelerates investments. Market Uncertainty does not a ect the duration of financing
rounds di erently with respect to R&D Intensity. Market Uncertainty does not ac-
celerate investments to projects that are fraught with endogenous risk, when measured
by industries R&D Intensity. But,Market Uncertainty a ects the duration of financ-
ing rounds di erently with respect to Growth Opportunities. Market Uncertainty
accelerates investments to projects that are fraught with endogenous risk, when mea-
sured by industries Growth Opportunities by approximately two and a half months.
This corresponds to 13% of the average duration of a financing round. We explain the
result by an acceleration of the discovery process.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix
Mean Std. Min Max (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
Internal Risk
(a) R&D-expenditures-to-sales 0.200 0.291 0.000 1.004
(b) Market-to-book 6.188 3.561 1.070 28.927 -0.002
External Risk
(c) VStoxx 0.235 0.101 0.116 0.875 -0.022 * -0.185 ***
Contract Design
(d) Debt 0.099 0.299 0.000 1.000 0.583 0.424 0.893
(e) Funding Size (mio. e) 3.185 8.705 0.002 502.740 0.095 *** -0.019 -0.003 -0.025 **
(f) Syndication 0.576 0.494 0.000 1.000 0.054 *** 0.020 * -0.008 -0.083 *** 0.125 ***
0.000 0.080 0.502 0.000 0.000
Endogenous Information
(g) Firm’s Age (Days) 1871 1987 0 38130 0.008 -0.020 * -0.006 0.066 *** 0.068 *** -0.019
(h) IPO 0.060 0.238 0.000 1.000 0.141 *** 0.022 * -0.004 0.002 0.108 *** 0.036 *** 0.066 ***
(i) Tradesale 0.266 0.442 0.000 1.000 -0.021 * 0.102 *** -0.053 *** 0.051 *** 0.047 *** 0.067 *** 0.013 -0.152 ***
0.069 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.274 0.000
Environmental Conditions
(j) Total VC Funding (mio. e) 3707 927 2671 5529 -0.014 -0.057 *** 0.461 *** 0.064 *** -0.031 *** -0.001 -0.013 0.006 0.045 ***
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Table 3: Variable Break-points
We identify firms fraught with endogenous risk based on industries’ R&D-to-sales ratio and market-to-book ratio; and financing rounds fraught with exogenous risk based on the
aggregate level of market price volatility at the funding date. We apply the method of Contal & O’Quigley (1999) to dichotomize the variables and use log rank test statistic to
estimate break-point values of the variables. For any R&D-expenditures-to-sales ratio, market-to-book ratio, or level of the VStoxx 50 Index above the break-point value, we assign
the project, resp. the financing round to be exposed to endogenous, resp. exogenous risk. The method of Contal & O’Quigley (1999) is an outcome-oriented approach to compute
break-point values corresponding on its most significant relation with the outcome, and is designed for survival analysis with censored data.
R&D-expenditures-to-sales Market-to-book VStoxx 50
Median 0.071 5.573 21.160
Break-point (Contal and O’Quigley, 1999) 0.113 5.538 19.900
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Table 4: Duration Analysis
Accelerated failure time model. Weibull distribution of the error term. Dependent: Duration of a financing round, defined as the time
between two subsequent financing events. The model is fit to the natural logarithm of the duration. Independent: R&D Intensity
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if venture firm’s industry R&D-expenditures-to-sales ratio is above the Contal and O’Quigley (1999)
break-point value, and zero otherwise. Growth Opportunities is a dummy variable equal to 1 if venture firm’s industry market-to-book
ratio ratio is above the Contal and O’Quigley (1999) break-point value, and zero otherwise. Market Uncertainty is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the VStoxx 50 Index is above the Contal and O’Quigley (1999) break-point value at the funding date, and zero otherwise.
The interaction variables are equal to 1 if Market Uncertainty and R&D Intensity, resp. Growth Opportunities are equal to 1, and zero
otherwise.
*** indicates significance at the 1% significance level, **indicates significance at the 5% significance level, * indicates significance at the
10% significance level. a indicates that the classification variables are significant at the 1% significance level based on type-3-e ect analysis.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 11.354 *** 13.100 *** 11.286 *** 12.894 *** 12.678 *** 8.699 ***
1.257 1.410 1.252 1.411 0.131 1.579
Endogenous Risk
R&D Intensity -0.120 *** -0.113 *** -0.134 *** -0.096 **
0.032 0.032 0.044 0.045
Growth Opportunities 0.017 0.030 0.099 ** 0.069
0.029 0.029 0.043 0.044
Exogenous Risk
Market Uncertainty 0.085 *** 0.078 ** 0.131 *** 0.212 ***
0.030 0.030 0.043 0.045
Joint E ect of Endogenous and Exogenous Risk
Market Uncertainty*R&D Intensity 0.022 0.012
0.057 0.057
Market Uncertainty*Growth Opportunities -0.121 ** -0.119 **
0.057 0.057
Contract Design
Debt -0.489 *** -0.485 *** -0.481 *** -0.478 *** -0.478 *** -0.466 ***
0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042
Log (Funding Size) -0.018 * -0.019 * -0.017 * -0.017 * -0.017 * -0.024 **
0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
Syndication -0.077 *** -0.076 *** -0.078 *** -0.077 *** -0.077 *** -0.072 **
0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028
Firm-specific Information
Log (Firm’s Age) 0.062 *** 0.060 *** 0.061 *** 0.060 *** 0.059 *** 0.058 ***
0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
IPO -1.019 *** -1.013 *** -1.014 *** -1.009 *** -0.827 *** -0.994 ***
0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.030 0.051
Tradesale -0.845 *** -0.835 *** -0.834 *** -0.827 *** -0.478 *** -0.813 ***
0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.042 0.030
Environmental Conditions
Log (Total VC Funding) -0.183 *** -0.264 *** -0.179 *** -0.254 *** -0.245 *** -0.219 ***
0.057 0.064 0.056 0.064 0.065 0.064
Firm’s Country included a included a included a included a included a included a
Firm’s Industry Sector included a included a included a included a included a included a
Market Timing of the VC
Log (Stock Market) 0.431 ***
0.077
N 7,336 7,336 7,336 7,336 7,336 7,336
Weibull Shape 1.079 1.079 1.079 1.080 1.080 1.083
Log Likelihood -10,120 -10,116 -10,113 -10,110 -10,108 -10,092
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4.5 Robustness Checks
In estimation (6), we control for the aggregate level of equity valuation by the Euro
Stoxx 50 Equity Price Index. This is done for two reasons: First, fund managers
window dress their investments towards extant valuations to impress sponsors (Lakon-
ishok et al., 1991). Exogenous risk might be related to window dressing of the VC
if market uncertainty and market valuation is correlated. If so, the impact of exoge-
nous risk might account for window dressing activities instead of a strategic invest-
ment decision. Second, endogenous risk estimated by the market-to-book ratio might
be biased towards the aggregate level of equity valuation. By its nature, the level
of the market-to-book ratio is impacted by market valuation in the time series. We
might assign more projects to be fraught with growth opportunities whose funding take
place in periods of high a market valuation. In estimation (6), Market Uncertainty
increases the delay of investments by approximately four and a half months. This
corresponds to 24% of the average duration of a financing round. The impact of
Market Uncertainty does not vanish when controlling for window dressing activities,
indicating thatMarket Uncertainty comprises strategic investing. Growth Opportunities
do not impact the duration for a low level of exogenous risk, indicating that the posi-
tive impact estimated in estimation (5) is driven by the selection bias. The interaction
term Market UncertaintyúGrowth Opportunities is still negative, its magnitude does
not change when compared to estimation (5).
Krohmer et al. (2009) analyze the investment decision of the VC related to endoge-
nous and exogenous risk by the development stage of the project: they argue that
endogenous risk is more present in early stages of the project when uncertainty about
entrepreneur’s e ort and ability is high; whereas exogenous risk is more present in later
stages of the project when the VC decides about an exit, or writing o  the project. We
do sub-sample regressions based on project’s investment status. We model failure time
of projects’ initial financing round to address timing of investments in the early stage
of the project; and failure time of subsequent financing rounds of the same project to
address timing of investments in later stages of the projects. Results are shown in table
5.
In estimation (7) and (8), we model the duration based on projects’ initial financing
round. The average duration of the financing rounds is 664 days, approximately 22
months. In estimation (7) we estimate the e ects of exogenous and endogenous risk
separately. In estimation (8) we consider interdependence of exogenous and endoge-
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nous risk. Market Uncertainty has no impact on the duration in estimation (7), but
has a slightly significant impact in estimation (8). Exogenous risk only slightly im-
pacts the duration of early stage projects, indicating that the delay of investments is
not valuable in early stages. R&D Intensity strongly decreases the duration by al-
most seven months, corresponding to 30% of the average duration of a financing round.
Growth Opportunities do not impact the duration.
In estimation (9) and (10), we model the duration based on the same projects’ sub-
sequent financing rounds. The average duration of the financing rounds is 564 days,
approximately 18.5 months. In estimation (9) we estimate the e ects of exogenous and
endogenous risk separately, in estimation (10) we consider interdependence of exoge-
nous and endogenous risk. Market Uncertainty increases the duration by approxi-
mately two and a half months in estimation (9), corresponding to 14% of the average
duration of a financing round; and by almost four months in model (10), corresponding
to 20% of the average duration of a financing round. R&D Intensity decreases the
duration by approximately one month in model (9), corresponding to 7% of the average
duration of a financing round; and by almost two month in estimation (10), correspond-
ing to 10% of the average duration of a financing round. Growth Opportunities do
not impact the duration in estimation (9); and increase duration by almost two month
in model (10), corresponding to 10% of the average duration of a financing round.
The interaction term Market UncertaintyúGrowth Opportunities is negative. The
magnitude is the same when compared to estimation (5) and (6). We find that the
delay option is valuable in later stages of the project, when compared to early stages.
Consequently, opportunity loss is more present in later stages of the project.
We test the fit of estimation (5) compared to alternative parametric estimations. We
present likelihood-ratio statistics and correlations of predicted and observed failure
times in table 6. Log-likelihoods are slightly higher for an exponential and log-normal
distribution of the error term when compared to the Weibull model we use. Our results
do not change if we apply an exponential or log-normal model. To calculate correlations
of predicted and observed failure times, we proceed as follows: We predict individual
failure time P by estimation (5) that includes all information about endogenous and
exogenous risk. We transform the predicted failure times into censored data. We cen-
sor predicted failure times that exceed the pre-fixed time of five years. We correlate
the simulated sample and the true sample to estimate the correlation coe cients. The
correlation coe cients are approximately 0.38 for all models, and statistically signifi-
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cant at p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Duration Analysis: Early Stage and Later Stages
Accelerated failure time model. Weibull distribution of the error term. Model (7) and (8) estimate the duration based on projects’
initial financing round. Model (9) and (10) estimate the duration based on the same projects’ subsequent financing rounds. Dependent:
Duration of a financing round, defined as the time between two subsequent financing events. The model is fit to the natural logarithm
of the duration. Independent: R&D Intensity is a dummy variable equal to 1 if venture firm’s industry R&D-expenditures-to-sales ratio
is above the Contal and O’Quigley (1999) break-point value, and zero otherwise. Growth Opportunities is a dummy variable equal to
1 if venture firm’s industry market-to-book ratio ratio is above the Contal and O’Quigley (1999) break-point value, and zero otherwise.
Market Uncertainty is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the VStoxx 50 Index is above the Contal and O’Quigley (1999) break-point value
at the funding date, and zero otherwise. The interaction variables are equal to 1 if Market Uncertainty and R&D Intensity, resp. Growth
Opportunities are equal to 1, and zero otherwise. Additionally we control for the financing instrument and quality more precisely;
financing instruments are Debt, Convertible Debt, Equity Swap; and including a control for bankruptcy, indicating low quality.
*** indicates significance at the 1% significance level, **indicates significance at the 5% significance level, * indicates significance at
the 10% significance level. a indicates that the classification variables are significant at the 1% significance level based on type-3-e ect
analysis. c indicates that the classification variables are significant at the 10% significance level based on type-3-e ect analysis.
(7) (8) (9) (10)
Intercept 10.571 *** 10.059 *** 14.082 *** 13.898 ***
2.605 2.632 1.694 1.713
Endogenousl Risk
R&D Intensity -0.260 *** -0.256 *** -0.066 * -0.093 *
0.060 0.080 0.037 0.053
Growth Opportunities 0.035 0.113 0.021 0.093 *
0.052 0.076 0.034 0.052
Exogenous Risk
Market Uncertainty 0.041 0.128 * 0.132 *** 0.185 ***
0.054 0.074 0.037 0.053
Joint E ect of Endogenous and Exogenous Risk
Market Uncertainty*R&D Intensity -0.045 0.032
0.105 0.067
Market Uncertainty*Growth Opportunities -0.151 -0.125 *
0.100 0.068
Contract Design
Debt -1.642 *** -1.619 *** -0.280 *** -0.279 ***
0.399 0.399 0.060 0.072
Convertible Debt -1.351 *** -1.351 *** -0.463 *** -0.466 ***
0.185 0.185 0.037 0.053
Equity Swap 0.097 *** 0.092 ***
0.059 0.170
Log (Funding Size) 0.034 * 0.034 * -0.030 ** -0.030 **
0.018 0.018 0.013 0.013
Syndication -0.047 -0.047 -0.049 -0.049
0.048 0.048 0.035 0.035
Firm-specific Information
Log (Firm’s Age) 0.077 *** 0.076 *** 0.120 *** 0.118 ***
0.012 0.012 0.020 0.021
IPO -0.809 *** -0.803 *** -0.970 *** -0.971 ***
0.108 0.107 0.060 0.060
Tradesale -0.645 *** -0.641 *** -0.787 *** -0.788 ***
0.058 0.058 0.037 0.037
Bankrupt 0.509 *** 0.514 *** 0.319 *** 0.324 ***
0.088 0.088 0.059 0.059
Environmental Conditions
Log (Total VC Funding) -0.183 -0.161 -0.328 *** -0.320 ***
0.119 0.120 0.076 0.077
Firm’s Country included a included a included a included a
Firm’s Industry Sector included c included c included a included a
N 2,421 2,421 4,915 4,915
Weibull Shape 1.137 1.138 1.076 1.077
Log Likelihood -3,095 -3,094 -6,915 -6,913
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Table 6: Fit Statistics
The sample is the observed failure time, in days. PWeibull is the predicted failure time by the accelerated failure time model using Weibull distribution of the error term. PExponential,
PGamma, PLlogistic, PLnormal are the predicted failure from exponential, general-Gamma, log-logistic modeling, and log-normal modeling. The log likelihood is reported for the
respective models.
Log Likelihood Sample PWeibull PExponential PGamma PLlogistic
Sample
PWeibull -10,108 0.380 ***
PExponential -10,128 0.379 *** 0.999 ***
PGamma -10,041 0.380 *** 0.995 *** 0.995 ***
PLlogistic -10,024 0.377 *** 0.978 *** 0.978 *** 0.993 ***
PLnormal -10,136 0.376 *** 0.974 *** 0.974 *** 0.991 *** 0.997 ***
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the optimal timing of investments in a set-up with exogenous
and endogenous risk. We consider interdependence of exogenous and endogenous risk
in that the strength of endogenous agency risk is related to the level of exogenous mar-
ket risk. This refers to the idea of a relative value of private benefits: in periods of high
market uncertainty, the entrepreneur’s expected payo  from the project is downgraded.
Private benefits from managing the firm become more attractive to the entrepreneur
relative to the successful realization of the project. As a consequence, his incentive to
behave opportunistically increases.
We analyze the investment decision from a real options perspective. The VC can re-
duce his exposer to exogenous risk by delaying investment and mitigate endogenous
risk by investing. If exogenous risk is particularly high, the VC has to increase the
share vested to the entrepreneur to keep him expending e ort in the hard times. Also,
the tightened agency risk forces the VC to accelerate investments to aggregate infor-
mation about the e ort of the entrepreneur. As a result, the VC abandons a fraction
of his delay option. In that, the discovery restricts the value of the delay option. This
strongly decreases the value of his investment and thus arises high opportunity loss.
The interdependence of exogenous and endogenous risk on the timing of investments is
economically significant in the real world. We find that VCs accelerate investments to
projects fraught with endogenous risk in periods of high market uncertainty by approx-
imately two and a half months when compared to periods of low market uncertainty.
This corresponds to 13% of the average duration of a financing round. Furthermore,
we find that the delay option is more valuable in later stages of a project when the
VC decides about an exit, or writing o  the project. Consequently, opportunity loss is
more present in the later stages of a venture project.
Our paper has several implications for theory and practice. This study contributes to
the extant research on agency risk in venture finance. So far, papers have considered
agency conflicts in venture projects to be time invariant (Bergemann & Hege, 1998;
Neher, 1999; Cornelli & Yosha, 2003). We show that this assumption is not realistic.
Moreover, the strength of agency conflicts is influenced by exogenous factors and varies
over time. We present one of those, namely market uncertainty.
On the one hand, our results might help to explain observed return patterns of VC
portfolios by an agency perspective. Since agency conflicts are the main reason for the
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existence of a VC industry (Amit et al., 1998), it is reasonable that they have a consid-
erable impact on the realized returns. Cochrane (2005) shows that return patterns of
VC portfolios characterize through a high alpha and a high market beta. First, the al-
pha accounts for ”abnormal” return that can not be explained by common risk factors.
The real options perspective might explain the phenomenon: VC investors successfully
apply stage financing to reduce downside losses. This results in an option like payo 
structure, where the option premium accounts for the alpha. Second, the high market
beta accounts for a high sensitivity of the return to market risk. Out idea of a rela-
tive value of private benefits might explain the phenomenon: agency risk tightens in a
period of high market uncertainty and forces the VC to accelerate investments. As a
result, the timing of VC investments is biased towards periods of high market risk.
The results suggest the implementation of contractual claims that focus eypecially on
the mitigation of agency conflicts in an environment of high exogenous risk. From the
perspective of the entrepreneur, exogenous market risk can be viewed as a high-risk
employment situation. The entrepreneur will lose his employment and future income
if the VC decides to abandon the project. Amernic (1984) and Eisenhardt (1989) show
that the principal has to compensate the cost of risky employment to retain managers
in high-risk situations. A fix compensation payment in periods of high exogenous risk
acts like a put-option: the entrepreneur can sell his shares to the VC at a pre-fixed price
if the project’s value is below a critical level. The compensation payment reduces the
relative value of private benefits in periods of high market risk, relaxing entrepreneur’s
incentive to behave opportunistically. This will allow the VC to capitalize on a larger
proportion of the delay option when it is most valuable.
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